The unintended consequences of semi‐autonomous revenue agencies
研究了税务机构从部门内机构转为半自主机构后，如何影响发展中国家的最优税制，发现这可能意外削弱税务机构的征税动力，为低税收收入提供新解释。
Abstract The past two decades have witnessed a fundamental change in how tax administrations are organized, from agencies within a ministry with little autonomy to organizations outside the institutional public service with separate legal status. This paper analyzes how a switch to a more autonomous tax administration affects a country's optimal tax system, consisting of the tax rate and the tax administration's effectiveness. I show that the creation of a more autonomous tax administration can have the unintended effect of dwarfing the tax administration's incentive to collect taxes in developing countries, adding a novel reason for the low tax revenue collections in developing countries.