Contractual acrobatics: a configurational analysis of outcome specifications and payment in outcome-based contracts
研究了结果导向合同中如何规范结果以及支付多少，通过分析34个英国社会影响债券发现，明确目标群体和估算死重效应能限制供应商获取不当价值，减少公共管理者为价值存疑的社会结果付费的风险。
Outcome-based contracting (OBC) seeks to improve public services by paying for service outcomes rather than service activities. This article explores the link between how outcomes are contractually specified and how much is paid for their achievement. Using fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis, we test a framework for assessing the strength of outcome specifications in 34 UK-based social impact bonds, a particular form of OBC. Results show that contract features which define intended participant cohorts and include deadweight estimation approaches help constrain suppliers’ ability to appropriate value and thus reduce the likelihood that public managers pay for social outcomes of questionable value.