Brand or Regular Manufacturer? Influencer's Cooperation Strategies Under Reputation Risk
研究了网红在品牌制造商（低佣金、无虚假宣传）和普通制造商（高佣金、可能虚假宣传）之间的合作选择，发现网红偏好与普通制造商合作，但佣金增加反而会减少其产品数量，且强制检查会促使网红只与品牌制造商合作。
This study investigates an influencer's cooperation strategies between two heterogeneous manufacturers whose products are claimed to have basic and additional features (premium products). The brand manufacturer (BM) has a low commission rate with no false claims about product features, while the regular manufacturer (RM) has a high commission rate with possible false claims. Consumers believe that the BM's product has both features but believe the influencer's claim that the RM's product has the additional feature to some extent. The results show that the influencer prefers to cooperate with the RM (cautious or adventurous strategy) or both manufacturers (dual-source strategy). Surprisingly, the influencer would reduce the product quantity of RM when the commission rate of RM increases. Besides, increasing the number of consumers concerned about the additional feature or consumers' valuation of this feature may decrease the premium product price. Moreover, when the influencer can inspect the RM's product, the voluntary inspection does not completely eliminate the risk of false claims, and the mandatory inspection stimulates the influencer to cooperate only with the BM. Finally, when considering consumer switching between the live-streaming channel and the direct channel, the influencer tends to cooperate only with the BM.