Health Certification in Sex Markets: A Field Experiment in Dakar, Senegal
研究了塞内加尔达喀尔性工作者健康认证率低的原因，通过随机提供信息和金钱激励发现，认证仅小幅增加，且没有价格溢价，内在污名化是主要障碍。
“Legalization and regulation” is a common approach to sex work regulation that eliminates some criminal penalties if sex workers obtain government health certification. In theory, by allowing sex workers to credibly disclose their health status, certification should enable higher prices. Yet certification rates in developing countries are typically low. I explore barriers to certification in Dakar, Senegal. I randomly offered uncertified sex workers information and an incentive covering the monetary cost of certification. This incentive only marginally increased certification. Individual- and transaction-level analysis show no evidence for a certification price premium and reveal that internalized stigma deters certification.