Hybrid Administrative Interfaces: Authority Delegation and Reversion in Strategic Alliances
研究了战略联盟中合作伙伴何时将决策权委托给指导委员会，以及何时将争议事项的权力回归给某一方，基于生物制药行业数据验证了协调成本和决策僵局的影响。
Steering committees are pivotal for governing complex collaborations by consensus to facilitate coordination and knowledge sharing. Although consensus-based governance promotes mutuality, it can also cause deadlocks, stalling expeditious decision making. We examine the conditions under which alliance partners delegate decision-making authority to steering committees as well as the conditions under which authority over discordant matters can be relocated to one of the alliance partners. We argue that joint coordination concerns increase the likelihood of authority delegation, whereas the higher costs and stakes associated with decision stalemates provide grounds for authority reversion. Empirical analyses of strategic alliances in the biopharmaceutical industry support our arguments. Our paper demonstrates the versatility of contractually defined administrative interfaces in alliance governance, allowing partners to coordinate bilaterally and adapt hierarchically as and when required.