Shareholder Monitoring through Voting: New Evidence from Proxy Contests
研究了共同基金在代理权争夺中的投票行为，发现被动基金投票支持异议方的可能性比主动基金低10个百分点，但差距在考虑弃权票、和解争夺等因素后显著缩小，表明被动基金在高风险投票中积极参与。
Abstract We present the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Among contests where voting takes place, passive funds are 10 percentage points less likely than active funds to vote for dissidents. The gap shrinks significantly when accounting for votes withheld from management nominees, settled contests, and votes by non-“Big-Three” fund families. Passive and active funds are equally informed about firm fundamentals, although passive funds view contest-related SEC filings more often than active funds during contests, in absolute levels and incrementally relative to noncontest periods. We conclude that passive funds are engaged shareholders in high-stakes voting events. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online