Evolution and the ultimatum game
回顾、升级并综合了演化博弈论中解释最后通牒博弈人类行为的模型，修正了原有模型的突变偏差问题，并通过实验数据比较发现，拒绝无适应度收益的模型预测与观察不符。
In this paper we review, upgrade, and synthesize existing models from evolutionary game theory, all of which aim at explaining human behaviour in the ultimatum game. Our new and improved versions of Gale et al. (1995), Nowak et al. (2000), and Rand et al. (2013) avoid shortcomings that the original versions have, one of which is that the results in the first and the last are driven by bias in the mutations. We also compare the predictions of these three models with the existing experimental evidence by looking at properties of the distributions of minimal acceptable offers. We find that the observed distributions do not conform to the predictions from Gale et al. (1995), Rand et al. (2013), or any other model in which there is no fitness benefit to rejecting. This does not rule out commitment-based explanations, such as Nowak et al. (2000).