Wage Wars: Institutional Politics, WPA Wages, and the Struggle for U.S. Social Policy
提出制度政治理论，分析1930年代WPA工资争议如何影响美国社会政策形成，发现民主化不足和庇护制政党体系会削弱福利支出，而国家行为者、左派政权和社会运动在有利制度下才能推动政策。
The WPA was the most expensive and politically prominent U.S. social program of the 1930s, and the generosity and very nature of U.S. social policy in its formative years was contested through the WPA. In this article, an institutional politics theory of social policy is elaborated that incorporates the influence of both institutional conditions and political actors: Institutions mediate the influence of political actors. Specifically, it is argued that underdemocratized political systems and patronage-oriented party systems dampen the cause of generous social spending and the impact of those struggling for it. State actors, left-party regimes, and social movements spur social policy, but only under favorable institutional conditions. To appraise this theory, key Senate roll-call votes on WPA wage rates are examined, as well as state-level variations in WPA wages at the end of the 1930s. The analyses, which include multiple regression and qualitative comparative analysis, support the theory.