Profitability of Noisy Certification in the Presence of Loss Averse Buyers*
研究了成本高昂的认证技术不准确时，垄断卖家的盈利能力变化，发现噪声认证虽不如准确认证盈利，但能抑制过度认证。
We study how the inaccuracy of a costly certification technology affects a monopolistic seller's profitability. We compare three scenarios: no certification, a 100% accurate certification, and a 50% accurate certification that produces accurate evaluations half the time. The noisy certification environment is never the most profitable and, depending on the buyers' loss aversion, can be the least profitable. However, a noisy certification can be more profitable than an accurate one, as it discourages the over‐certification that occurs in an accurate certification environment. Experimentally, the noisy certification is shown to be the least profitable treatment, whereas the accurate certification is shown to be the most profitable.