Informational Holdup by Venture Capital Syndicates
研究认为风险投资辛迪加通过组合不同经验水平的VC，降低创始人威胁停止融资的预期收益，从而解释早期辛迪加经验异质性与后期换团现象。
Abstract We argue that syndicates associate venture capitalists (VCs) with uneven skill levels in order to lower their expected gains from threatening to stop financing: Non-continued participation would send a milder negative signal to alternative financiers. This can explain the empirical observations that i) early-round syndicates regularly associate VCs with different levels of experience and ii) follow-on syndicates often involve none of the early-round VCs. Consistent with the theory, we find empirically that the heterogeneity of VC experience levels in a syndicate is i) negatively related to the extent to which the founders of the VC-backed firm are professionally well connected and ii) positively related to the likelihood of syndicate switching in a later round.