Citizen expectations, agency reputation and public service quality
本文通过博弈论模型研究公民期望、满意度和机构声誉如何影响公共服务质量，发现当机构与公民利益不一致时，过去的高满意度反而导致当前绩效下降。
This article examines the relationship between citizen expectations, citizen satisfaction, agency reputation and agency behaviour in public management. We expand upon the assumptions of the expectancy disconfirmation model (EDM) and present a game-theoretic model that explores the interplay between agency reputation, citizen expectations, citizen satisfaction and agency behaviour by integrating perspectives from reputation and commitment problems literature. Our study highlights the uncertainty generated by bureaucracies with misaligned motives, which occasionally prioritize their own interests over the public’s. We delve into the dynamics of agency and citizen behaviour over time, considering potential shifts in agency priorities. We also explore how citizen satisfaction conditions future expectations and influences the behaviour of service providers in improving public service performance. We show that agencies with misaligned priorities with the citizenry provide poorer current performance when past citizen satisfaction is greater. Yet, from the citizens’ perspective, better past citizen satisfaction is associated with higher current expected service quality. Our findings complement existing literature on citizen satisfaction and expand our understanding of how satisfaction affects government service providers. They underscore the importance of addressing misaligned motives within bureaucracies and the role of citizen satisfaction in shaping agency behaviour. These results have important implications for bureaucratic behaviour, administrative burden and organizational reputation theories and practices.