The end of bank secrecy: implications for redistribution and optimal taxation
研究了打击离岸逃税如何通过两个渠道影响税收系统的再分配性质：一是机械地提高高收入者的平均税率（美国前0.01%人群约提高1.5个百分点），二是改变最优税收的权衡，支持对高收入征收更高税率。
Abstract This paper argues that the ability to enforce taxes on offshore income may shape the redistributional properties of the tax system through two channels. First, it mechanically raises tax progressivity for given parameters of the tax system because high-income taxpayers own most of the offshore wealth. In the US, recent comprehensive reporting by offshore banks suggests the mechanical increase in average tax rates may be around 1.5 percentage points for the top 0.01 per cent and virtually zero below the top 1 per cent. Second, it may further raise tax progressivity by changing the trade-offs underlying optimal taxation in favour of higher taxation of top incomes.