Subsidiarity Ex Ante and Ex Post: From the Early Warning System to the Court of Justice of the European Union
本文研究了《里斯本条约》下欧盟辅助性原则的事前（国家议会通过早期预警系统）与事后（欧盟法院司法审查）审查之间的联系，发现两者存在微弱条件关联，主要原因是法院执行辅助性原则的意愿有限。
Abstract The subsidiarity principle divides competences between the European Union and its Member States. The Lisbon Treaty suggests a connection between ex ante and ex post subsidiarity review. Ex ante, national parliaments were given a role via the early warning system (EWS). Ex post, legislation is subject to review by the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). More than 10 years after Lisbon, this article is the first to theorize and evaluate whether there is indeed a connection. Our theory predicts a conditional connection. Quantitatively, we provide a two‐way classification of Member States based on their use of the EWS and CJEU subsidiarity cases. Qualitatively, we look back from court cases to the Council stage and analyse the Advocate General's opinions in subsidiarity cases. We find a weak conditional connection. A key explanation appears to be the Court's limited willingness to enforce subsidiarity and hence the limited incentives to go to court.