Earnings guidance stoppage and the value of financial analysts' research
研究经理停止提供季度盈利指引后，分析师推荐修正的市场反应显著增强，尤其对信息环境不透明和此前提供细分指引的公司影响更大，且分析师报告更长、更频繁、更具前瞻性。
Abstract We examine the relation between voluntary disclosure and the value of analysts' research by studying the change in the informativeness of analysts' research after managers stop providing quarterly guidance to investors. We find that the market reaction to analysts' recommendation revisions increases significantly after guidance stoppage, controlling for confounding factors as well as for firm and time fixed effects. The increase in market reaction is greater for firms with more opaque information environments and for firms that previously provided disaggregated guidance. Further, the effect of guidance stoppage on the informativeness of analysts' research reverses after managers resume guidance. Finally, textual analyses of analysts' reports before and after guidance stoppage reveal that analysts issue longer, more frequent, and more detailed reports that convey more forward‐looking information after stoppages. These findings collectively shed light on the relation between the supply of voluntary disclosure and the value that sell‐side analysts add to price discovery in capital markets.