Taxation and Durable Goods Monopoly*
研究了在动态垄断的耐用品市场中，税收如何通过调节边际税率来激励垄断者加速交易，并分析了在预算约束下不同承诺能力对税收政策效果的影响。
This paper studies the role of taxation in durable good markets with dynamic monopolies. By conditioning the marginal tax rate on the volume of trade, the regulator can provide incentives for the monopolist to accelerate trade. When marginal cost pricing generates a loss for the monopolist, strategic delay cannot be avoided under regulatory budget constraint and the effects of tax policy depend on the monopolist's ability to commit. In the context of binary consumer types, we find a tax policy involving “back‐loaded subsidy” that achieves the second‐best outcome with commitment. In contrast, without commitment, a “front‐loaded subsidy” improves welfare.