Second‐chance offers and buyer reputation systems: theory and evidence on auctions with default
研究了在线拍卖中二次出价和买家声誉系统如何影响竞拍者行为，发现二次出价会降低出价，卖家无动力排除违约者，而声誉系统反而奖励有违约记录的买家。
Abstract Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow “second‐chance” offers (the runner‐up bidder pays his own bid price) and let sellers leave negative feedback on buyers who default. We show theoretically that (i) all else equal, the availability of second‐chance offers reduces bids; (ii) sellers have no incentive to exclude bidders, even if they are nearly certain to default; (iii) buyer reputation systems reward bidders known to default with a positive probability. Our experiments show that the economic forces identified in the theoretical model are important enough to have predictive power for bidder behavior.