Asymmetric market power and wage suppression
研究两个相同企业在劳动力市场中先通过广告或筛选争夺工人、后进行工资竞争，发现唯一纯策略均衡是不对称的：一家企业最大化其市场覆盖，另一家则接受较小的市场份额，且该特征可推广到一般寡头垄断。
Abstract We study a labor market in which two identical firms compete over a pool of homogeneous workers. Firms pre‐commit to their outreach to potential employees, either through their informative advertising choices, or through their screening processes, before engaging in a wage (Bertrand) competition. Although firms are homogeneous, the unique pure‐strategy equilibrium is asymmetric: one firm maximizes its outreach whereas the other compromises on a significantly smaller market share. The features of the asymmetric equilibrium extend to a general oligopsony with any finite number of firms.