Monetary and Macroprudential Policy and Welfare in an Estimated Four‐Agent New Keynesian Model
在一个包含四类主体的宏观经济模型中，研究了货币与宏观审慎政策对社会及各主体福利的影响，发现最优资本要求和贷款损失准备金率能改善福利，但依赖信贷的简单家庭和企业主获益较小。
Abstract We examine the social and agent‐specific welfare effects of monetary and macroprudential policy in a four‐agent estimated macro‐economic model comprising “ banked simple households ,” “ underbanked simple households ,” “ firm owners ,” and “ bank owners .” Optimal capital requirement and loan loss provisions ratios improve all agent‐specific and social welfare, but imply smaller gains for simple households and firm owners that rely on credit. Countercyclical capital buffers support firm owners and bank owners with smaller gains for the two simple households, while countercyclical loan loss provisions improve social welfare only for specific shocks. Coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies yields higher social welfare than no coordination.