CFO pay convexity, risk taking and corporate hedging
利用2009-2019年美国油气公司的手工数据，研究CFO薪酬凸性如何影响企业对冲决策，发现CFO股权薪酬凸性负向影响对冲，且当CFO与CEO激励冲突时CFO起主导作用。
Abstract We study how a CFO's risk‐taking incentives affect corporate hedging by utilising hand‐collected data from 2009 to 2019 on corporate hedging and managerial compensation for a sample of US oil and gas firms. The relative convexity of CFO equity compensation negatively affects the likelihood and extent of hedging. When the CFO and CEO have diverging risk‐taking incentives, the relative convexity of the CFO's equity payoff prevails over that of the CEO. This evidence underscores the primary role of the CFO in steering a firm's hedging strategy.