Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective
从选民角度分析最优税收政策，指出选民的自认无知使其偏好透明稳定的税制以减少错误，但规范性利益可能支持复杂税制，民主最优税制既不最小化选民错误也不最大化社会福利函数。
Abstract This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self‐acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily. Such properties reduce voter mistakes. However, a voter's normative interests may conflict with these practical interests, because ideas about a good life or good society often support tax system complexity. Tradeoffs between these two aims of democratic tax systems imply that the optimal tax system for a democracy neither minimizes voter errors nor maximizes a social welfare function.