An Examination of the Terminal Year in an Auditor-Client Relationship
研究了审计师与客户关系最后一年（即审计师即将离任时）的成本与后果，发现离任审计师更可能收取更高审计费用、出具更多持续经营疑虑意见和不利内部控制意见，表明公司面临实际经济成本。
SYNOPSIS We examine the cost and consequences of switching auditors. Specifically, we consider several client costs (audit fees, going-concern opinions, and internal control opinions) in the last year of an audit engagement (“terminal year”). We find that outgoing auditors are more likely to charge higher audit fees, issue more going-concern opinions, and issue more adverse internal control opinions during the terminal years of their audits. These findings suggest that outgoing auditors gain greater bargaining power, are more likely to charge for additional hours of audit work, and are less likely to yield to client pressures. Overall, our results suggest that companies face real economic costs from the outgoing auditor in addition to the start-up costs of the incoming auditor. Data Availability: Data are publicly available from sources identified in the text. JEL Classifications: G31; G32; G33; M21.