Share repurchases and managerial reference points
研究发现，当公司当前股价低于之前回购价格时，管理层更倾向于进行股票回购，且这一行为在股票分割后减弱、在损失区域不对称、在先前回购价格更显著时增强，不能用传统回购动机解释。
Abstract This study examines the relationship between managerial reference points and corporate payout policy. We find that share repurchase activity increases as a firm's current stock price declines in relation to the price at which it previously repurchased shares. To facilitate a behavioral interpretation of this relation, we show that it weakens around stock splits, is asymmetric over gains and losses, and strengthens when prior repurchase prices are more salient. Further, the relation is not explained by traditional repurchase motives. The results suggest a behavioral pattern in which managers use prior repurchase prices as reference points for current repurchases.