THE SHAPING OF A GENDER NORM: MARRIAGE, LABOR, AND FOOT‐BINDING IN HISTORICAL CHINA
提出理论解释历史中国缠足的兴起，认为男性社会流动机会的性别不对称冲击导致婚姻市场中男性质量分布分散，进而引发女性竞争，实证支持了男性社会流动机会促进缠足、女性劳动成本抑制缠足的预测。
Abstract This article presents a theory that explains the rise of foot‐binding in historical China, in response to a gender‐asymmetric social mobility shock that dispersed men's quality distribution in the marriage market. The theory characterizes the marriage market equilibrium and women's competition strategies before and after the shock. Empirical evidence using archival data corroborates the theoretical predictions that greater men's social mobility opportunities encouraged foot‐binding and that a greater cost of women's labor discouraged foot‐binding. The article thus highlights that costly gender norms can be traced back to gender asymmetry in social mobility opportunities.