Market Structure, Oligopsony Power, and Productivity
研究中国烟草行业规模管制导致的产权集中如何增强买方垄断力，发现其使投入品价格压低平均上升37%，降低配置效率并减少农村家庭收入。
I examine the effects of oligopsony power on allocative efficiency and income redistribution by studying a size regulation in the Chinese tobacco industry that led to ownership consolidation. I show that separate identification of input price markdowns, goods price markups, and productivity is challenging when a subset of inputs is nonsubstitutable, which often holds for materials, and construct and estimate a model to overcome this challenge. I find that the regulation increased input price markdowns by 37 percent on average. This increase in oligopsony power led to a decline in allocative efficiency and redistributed income away from rural households.