Accounting Bias and Debt Contracting
研究了会计偏差对债务融资投资效率的影响，发现对悲观前景向下偏差、乐观前景向上偏差能最大化投资效率，且最优契约紧度呈U形、最优利率呈倒U形。
This study investigates the effects of accounting bias on the efficiency of a debt-financed investment, which is subject to an interim liquidation/continuation decision based on the accounting report. We decompose the overall effect of accounting bias into a mean effect and a variance effect and transform binary state and report spaces into continuous ones. We derive two main results. (1) The highest investment efficiency is induced by a downward bias for gloomy investment prospects and an upward bias for rosy investment prospects. (2) The optimal covenant tightness is U-shaped and the optimal interest rate is hump-shaped in the degree of bias. In particular, neutral (unbiased) accounting neither minimizes the variance of the report nor maximizes investment efficiency.