Expropriation Risk and Investment: A Natural Experiment
利用中国2007年《物权法》降低地方政府征收风险这一自然实验，研究发现此前产权保护较弱的企业在法案实施后显著增加了投资并提高了投资效率，且该效应通过降低企业感知的征收风险实现。
Abstract This article uses the enactment of China’s 2007 Property Law (the Law), which reduces the risk of expropriation by local governments, as the setting to investigate the importance of property rights protection for private firm investment. Using propensity score matching and a difference-in-differences design, we find that firms facing weaker property rights protection prior to the Law significantly increase their investment and investment efficiency after the Law. Cross-sectional analyses document evidence consistent with a decrease in firms’ perceived expropriation risk as the main mechanism underlying the Law’s effect. Finally, we show that the Law improves local economic outcomes and employment.