The New Invisible Hand: How Common Owners Use the Media as a Strategic Tool
研究发现，当机构投资者同时持有媒体公司和一家非媒体企业的竞争对手的股份时，该企业会获得更差的媒体报道，因为投资者有动机和权力利用媒体来提升其投资组合中其他公司的竞争力。
While research has uncovered an array of visible competitive dynamics, a strategic world of competition lies beneath the surface that should also be theorized and empirically traced. We investigate the strategic consequences of “media–rival” common ownership, in which investors own a media company and a non-media focal firm’s rivals. We posit that focal firms receive worse coverage from media outlets when institutional investors hold substantial ownership in both a media company and the focal firm’s rivals because the investors’ common holdings provide them with incentives and power to enhance the competitiveness of their portfolio firms by tainting the focal firm’s media coverage. We account for three moderators to show that this effect amplifies when investors have stronger incentives and power to influence the media and when media executives have incentives to cater to the interests of their investors. Using a novel dataset on common ownership of rival firms and media companies, we find support for our theory. Our study reveals a new invisible hand underlying competitive markets and offers a new view of the media as a strategic tool.