UNEMPLOYMENT DURATION UNDER FLEXIBLE INFORMATION ACQUISITION
研究了工人求职中企业灵活获取信息对失业持续时间的影响，发现内生信息会放大长期失业的污名效应，且降低信息获取成本对失业持续时间的影响不确定。
Abstract We consider a worker's job search problem in which firms arrive sequentially, observe the worker's unemployment duration, and conduct an interview to learn about her unobservable productivity. Firms engage in fully flexible information acquisition subject to a uniformly posterior‐separable cost function. We provide a closed‐form characterization of equilibrium job search dynamics and demonstrate that endogenous information amplifies the “stigma” effect of long unemployment duration relative to exogenous information. We also show that lowering firms' information‐acquisition costs has ambiguous implications for a worker's unemployment duration.