Born after the Volcker Rule: Regulatory change, managerial remuneration and hedge fund performance
研究发现，沃尔克规则实施后，来自大型美国银行的新对冲基金经理收取更高管理费并吸引更多资金流入，但这并非源于技能差异，而是投资者认知变化。
Abstract Substantial remunerative benefits accrue to managers of new hedge funds launched after the implementation of the Volcker Rule if their previous employer is a large US bank. After the rule, ex‐bankers' funds charge higher management fees and receive more flows as compared with other new hedge funds established during the same period. This phenomenon is related to changes in investor perception of the distribution of skills of new fund managers rather than to the actual differences in skills. Ex‐bankers' funds are indistinguishable from other funds in terms of performance, risk, and liquidation probability, both before and after the Volcker Rule.