The folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma with endogenous private monitoring
研究了重复囚徒困境中玩家每期可内生选择监督结构的情形，发现当无人能独断时，在特定聚合函数下任何严格个体理性且可行的收益向量都可作为序贯均衡结果。
We study the repeated prisoner's dilemma with private monitoring under the assumption that the monitoring structure is endogenously chosen by the players in each period. We allow the players to choose from all possible monitoring structures. If the players disagree on the monitoring structure they would like, the realized monitoring structure is determined by a function that aggregates their choices. When one player can dictate the monitoring structure, then the repetition of the stage Nash is the only sequential equilibrium outcome. In contrast, when no player can dictate the monitoring structure, we provide conditions on the aggregation function under which any strictly individually rational and feasible payoff vector can be supported in sequential equilibrium.