The Effect of Mandatory Disclosure Dissemination on Information Asymmetry among Investors: Evidence from the Implementation of the EDGAR System
研究SEC的EDGAR系统实施如何影响投资者间的信息不对称，发现尽管降低了信息获取成本，但整合成本使非专业投资者处于劣势，整体上加剧了信息不对称。
ABSTRACT I study the effect of the implementation of the SEC’s EDGAR system on information asymmetry among investors. The SEC adopted EDGAR to decrease acquisition costs of mandatory filings. However, disclosure theory suggests that, even when acquisition costs are low, integration costs (i.e., costs necessary to filter and interpret information signals) may be so high that less sophisticated investors are disadvantaged, relative to their sophisticated peers. Consistent with this theory, I find evidence that EDGAR increased information asymmetries among investors. This result is more pronounced for firms with higher integration costs—i.e., those with more complex filings and filings that have higher information content—as well as for firms with lower analyst coverage. Overall, my results suggest that, although EDGAR lowered acquisition costs for all investors, it also benefited some investors at the expense of others. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: M21; M41; G00; G12; G18; O33.