Proxy favors: Confidential proxy voting with institutional dual holders
研究发现，当投票不保密时，机构双重持有者会给予管理层更有利的投票支持，尤其是薪酬提案，但这会导致企业借款成本上升；保密投票能消除这种互惠偏袒。
Abstract Research Question/Issue For firms with institutional dual holders, is proxy voting affected by whether the vote is confidential? Does confidential voting affect firms' cost of debt? Research Findings/Insights Consistent with social exchange theory and reciprocity norms, we find that, in the absence of confidential voting, firms with institutional dual holders gain more favorable votes for proposals and, in particular, for management‐sponsored compensation proposals. Further, these firms pay a higher cost of borrowing. This reciprocity relation does not exist if the firm has confidential voting in place. Theoretical/Academic Implications The results are consistent with reciprocity norms creating a psychological obligation to repay valuable favors between firm managers and institutional dual holders when proxy votes are not confidential. Practitioner/Policy Implications The findings support the popular position that confidential voting is in the best interests of shareholders and rigorous external corporate governance.