Common Venture Capital Investors and Startup Growth
利用责任豁免法律变化的冲击，研究发现共同风险投资人能促进同行业初创企业获得更多资本、减少失败并提高成功退出率，机制是风险投资人通过担任董事促进信息交流。
Abstract We exploit the staggered introduction of liability waivers when investors hold stakes in conflicting business opportunities as a shock to venture capital (VC) investment and director networks. After the law changes, we find increases in within-industry VC investment and common directors serving on startup boards. Despite the potential for rent extraction, same-industry startups inside VC portfolios benefit by raising more capital, failing less, and exiting more successfully. VC directors serving on other startup boards are the primary mechanism associated with positive outcomes, consistent with common VC investment facilitating informational exchanges in VC portfolios. Authors have furnished an Internet Appendix, which is available on the Oxford University Press Web site next to the link to the final published paper online.