Common Ownership, Executive Compensation, and Product Market Competition
研究了共同所有权如何通过基于收入的薪酬影响产品市场竞争，发现除极少数高度集中所有者外，共同所有权并未导致企业减少使用基于收入的薪酬，不支持共同所有者通过薪酬合同削弱竞争激励的观点。
ABSTRACT The negative effects of common ownership on competition have received significant attention, but many proposed mechanisms for institutional investor influence seem implausible. We develop and test an analytical model of optimal compensation in an oligopoly with common ownership, focusing on revenue-based pay as a plausible channel through which institutional investors might influence competition. Our model implies a negative effect of common ownership on firms’ use of revenue-based pay. Using both associative analyses and an event study difference-in-differences design based on plausibly exogenous institutional mergers, we find no evidence of a negative relation between common ownership and the use of revenue-based pay, except in an economically small subsample of extremely concentrated owners. Results involving relative performance incentives are similar. Collectively, our results provide no support for the notion that cross-owning blockholders in general influence compensation contracts in order to soften executives’ incentives to compete aggressively. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: D43; G30; L13; M12; M40; M52.