The Deterrent Effect of Whistleblowing on Insider Trading
研究了多德-弗兰克法案的举报人计划是否减少了公司内部人的知情交易，发现该计划显著降低了受影响较大公司内部人的买入交易利润，并减少了负面事件前的卖出次数。
Abstract I study whether the Dodd–Frank whistleblower program reduced informed trading by corporate insiders. To identify the effect, I partition firms based on the extent to which this program affected the likelihood of whistleblowing at each firm. I find a relative reduction in trading profits on purchases made by insiders at more affected firms after the program was initiated. I analyze insider sales in settings where they are more likely to be informed and find a reduction in the number of sales before negatively perceived events. The results suggest that whistleblower protections and rewards can effectively deter insider trading.