Does D&O insurance mislead creditors' lending decisions? Evidence from corporate debt maturity structure
研究发现购买董事高管责任保险会延长公司债务期限，尤其在治理薄弱的企业中更明显，但该保险实际上增加了企业风险、加剧了管理层机会主义，并未改善治理或业绩，从而误导了债权人的贷款决策。
Abstract This study investigates whether directors' and officers' liability insurance (D&O insurance) misleads creditors' lending decisions by examining its effect on corporate debt maturity structure. We find that purchasing D&O insurance leads to increased corporate debt maturity, and this effect is more pronounced for firms with weaker corporate governance. These results suggest that creditors may view D&O insurance as an external monitoring tool that helps improve corporate governance. However, D&O insurance induces higher firm risk, but cannot help decrease agency costs or improve firm performance, that is, it results in more severe managerial opportunism. Our findings suggest that D&O insurance, to some extent, misguides creditors' lending decisions.