CEO Political Ideology and Voluntary Forward-Looking Disclosure
研究了共和党与民主党CEO在管理层盈利预测上的差异，发现共和党CEO更偏好低信息不对称环境，因此披露更频繁、及时和准确，且结果在控制内生性后依然稳健。
Abstract This study investigates whether the management earnings forecasts of Republican and Democratic CEOs differ due to systematic differences in their information disclosure preferences. We find that Republican CEOs prefer a less asymmetric information environment than Democrat CEOs, and thus make more frequent, timelier, and more accurate disclosures than Democrat CEOs. Results using the propensity score matched sample and difference-in-differences analysis show that our results are unlikely to be driven by potential endogeneity. Our results are robust to controlling for various CEO characteristics and are stronger for firms with higher levels of institutional ownership and litigation risk.