Preference Constellations in EU–Russian Crisis Bargaining over Syria and Ukraine
研究认为，在欧盟与俄罗斯的危机谈判中，偏好格局（即哪方更坚定、团结、专注）比实力对比更能决定结果，并解释了俄罗斯为何能在叙利亚和乌克兰问题上以弱胜强。
Abstract The Russian invasion of Ukraine in early 2022 and the ensuing EU–Russian clash over the fate of Ukraine highlight the importance of explaining the outcomes of EU–Russian crisis bargaining. Complementing existing accounts, we argue that favourable preference constellations are key: The more determined, united and focused side prevails over its less interested, divided or unfocused counterpart. We first establish the inferiority of Russia's influence assets (economic, military, normative and allies) relative to the EU. We then use congruence analysis to reverse‐engineer crisis bargaining outcomes in key cases of EU–Russian crisis bargaining, showing that favourable preference constellations allowed Russia, despite inferior assets and EU opposition, to ensure Syrian dictator Assad's political survival, finalize the annexation of Crimea in 2014 and keep Donbass out of Kyiv's control since then. Finally, we discuss the implications of these findings for related areas, as well as for current and future EU–Russian crisis bargaining, specifically over Ukraine.