Target Setting in Hierarchies: The Role of Middle Managers
研究探讨了中层管理者在目标设定中如何受上级压力影响，导致更倾向于根据员工过去绩效调整目标，削弱了不惩罚高绩效员工的承诺可信度。
ABSTRACT We explore how a supervisor's hierarchical rank affects the extent to which employees’ targets reflect their past performance. Literature documents that supervisors do not fully ratchet targets for past performance, arguably because the commitment not to penalize successful employees with more difficult targets alleviates the severity of the ratchet effect. We argue that commitment is less credible in organizational hierarchies where a middle manager sets employees’ targets. Using data from an organization comprised of three hierarchical layers, we consistently find that a middle manager's exposure to performance pressure is positively associated with the ratcheting of the employees’ targets. Moreover, we show that management at headquarters reduces a middle manager's performance pressure when most of her employees missed their targets in the previous period. Overall, the results imply that the hierarchical rank is an important determinant of the credibility of a supervisor's commitment to deemphasize past performance in target setting.