Implicit Incentives and Delegation in Teams
研究了在重复博弈的团队生产中，委托人授权给团队成员决策如何改变同伴制裁的范围，从而影响隐性激励，并发现授权在多样化团队中最优。
We study an infinitely repeated game of team production, where agents must supply costly effort under moral hazard. The principal also has the option to delegate an additional production-relevant decision to a team member. We provide conditions under which delegation changes the scope of peer sanction and thus influences the implicit incentives generated by the agents’ repeated interaction. Delegation can then become strictly optimal, despite misaligned preferences and symmetric information regarding the efficient decision. We show that implicit incentives under delegation are strongest in diverse teams and use our results to discuss various aspects of organizational design, including self-organized teamwork. This paper was accepted by Suraj Srinivasan, accounting. Funding: This work was supported by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft [Project-ID 403041268—TRR 266 Accounting for Transparency]. Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2022.02212 .