Monitoring versus Discounting in Repeated Games
研究了在不完美监督（公开或私人）的重复博弈中，贴现和监督如何共同决定合作是否可能，给出了一个关于激励强度的简单边界，并证明了在低贴现和低监督的双重极限下该边界是紧的。
We study how discounting and monitoring jointly determine whether cooperation is possible in repeated games with imperfect (public or private) monitoring. Our main result provides a simple bound on the strength of players' incentives as a function of discounting, monitoring precision, and on‐path payoff variance. We show that the bound is tight in the low‐discounting/low‐monitoring double limit, by establishing a public‐monitoring folk theorem where the discount factor and the monitoring structure can vary simultaneously.