Competition in costly talk
研究了两个利益冲突的知情发送者向不知情决策者报告信息时，谎报成本随谎报规模增加，刻画了始终存在、唯一且稳健的均衡，其中信息部分传递且存在说服，而完全信息均衡不稳健。
This paper studies a communication game between an uninformed decision maker and two perfectly informed senders with conflicting interests. Senders can misreport information at a cost that increases with the size of the misrepresentation. The main result concerns the characterization of equilibria with desirable properties: they always exist, are essentially unique, and are robust. Information transmission is partial in these equilibria, and persuasion occurs on the equilibrium path. By contrast, equilibria where the decision maker obtains her complete-information payoff are not robust, and hinge on beliefs with potentially undesirable properties.