Implications of Demand Information Transparency on a Platform's Bundling Strategy
研究了电商平台与上游供应商之间的信息不对称如何影响捆绑销售，发现转售模式下平台不愿共享信息且捆绑倾向随需求不确定性增加而降低，代理模式下高佣金率促使信息共享而中等替代性和佣金率时倾向捆绑。
Bundling sales exhibit significant advantages and popularity on e-commerce platforms. However, information asymmetry between the platform and upstream suppliers dramatically affects bundling sales, but the influencing mechanism remains unclear. In this article, we introduce information sharing into bundling sales and focus on the interaction between information sharing decisions and bundling sales strategies. Our findings show that under the reselling mode, the platform exhibits a reluctance to share information with suppliers, and the inclination toward bundling diminishes as demand uncertainty rises. Conversely, under the agency mode, the platform tends to engage in information sharing when faced with high commission rates, while leaning toward bundling sales when the degree of substitution between individual products and bundled products, as well as commission rates, is moderate. Specifically, we find that in the agency mode, the platform's information sharing decisions inhibit its bundling sales strategies. Furthermore, we observe a gradual shift in the platform's distribution mode preference toward the reselling mode as demand uncertainty escalates. These findings offer valuable insights for platform management in optimizing the operational efficiency of the entire supply chain.