Economic demand for auditing services in the “registered” investment management industry
研究发现注册投资公司对审计的需求源于审计师在财务造假时作为有偿赔偿者的角色，因此更倾向聘请四大会计师事务所，且四大财富越多、市场份额越大，审计费与财富正相关，客户转向四大后基金净流入增加。
Abstract We hypothesize that the demand for auditing in the registered investment management industry arises from the auditor's ability to act as a solvent indemnifier when outside parties incur losses because of financial misrepresentations. Consistent with this insurance demand, we find that, relative to financial companies, registered investment companies are more likely to retain Big 4 auditors. Restricting the sample to the registered investment management industry, we construct three direct tests of the insurance demand hypothesis. We find that (a) the market share of a Big 4 firm is positively associated with the firm's wealth, (b) changes in audit fees are positively associated with changes in the audit firms’ wealth, and (c) net fund flows increase when clients switch from non‐Big 4 to Big 4 auditors. Our results highlight an unusually high demand for Big 4 auditors in the registered investment industry, which we attribute to the insurance demand for auditing services.