A Welfare Gain from Switching to Taxes? The Danish Cod Fishery in the Kattegat
理论表明，当管理者比渔民更不确定渔业关键参数时，转向税收管制可能带来福利增益。本文估计丹麦鳕鱼渔业从个人可转让配额转向税收管制，仅产生行业利润0.023%的小幅福利增益。
Theoretical papers show that there could be a welfare gain from switching to tax regulation if managers are more uncertain about key parameters of a fishery than fishers. We estimate the size of the welfare gain that would result if a manager of the Danish cod fishery in the Kattegat switched from the current individual transferable quota system to tax regulation. We find that this would generate a small welfare gain of 0.023% of the industry profit and variations in parameter values (± 20%) at most result in a gain of 0.039%.