Options Trading and Earnings Management
研究发现期权交易量能抑制经理人的盈余操纵行为，且这一效应源于期权市场的独特特征，对投资者和监管者评估市场效率有参考价值。
SYNOPSIS This study examines how options trading plays a unique role in curbing firms’ earnings management. We find that options trading volume deters managers’ earnings manipulations, and the effect can be explained by unique characteristics of the options markets. Our results remain unchanged when using both an instrumental variable approach and difference-in-differences analyses to mitigate endogeneity concerns, and after controlling for investors’ short-selling activities. This study adds to the literature by documenting a real impact of options trading on financial reporting. Our results suggest that the options markets promote price efficiency not only by incorporating private information from informed traders, but also by incentivizing managers to disseminate less manipulated information. Data Availability: The data that support the findings of this study are available from the second author upon request. JEL Classifications: E44; G3; M41.