Common Lender, Ex-Banker Director, and Corporate Investment
研究发现，因政府主导的大银行合并而共享共同贷款人的日本竞争企业，其资本投资平均下降15%；若共同贷款人通过前雇员担任企业执行董事来施加影响，投资下降更显著，同时企业利润率和加价率上升，表明贷款人促使借款人战略协调以减轻竞争压力。
Abstract Due to the government-driven mergers of large banks, many competing firms in Japan ended up borrowing from a common lender. Using firm-level data, we find that the capital investments of competing firms that share a common lender decrease by 15% of the mean. When a common lender can exercise its voice through its former employees serving as firms’ executive directors, investments fall significantly further. Competing firms that share a common lender increase markups and profitability ratios, suggesting that the lender induces strategic coordination among its borrowers to reduce their competitive pressures. Firms use saved resources from weaker competition for cash cushions.