Behavioral agency and the efficacy of analysts as external monitors: Examining the moderating role of CEO personality
结合行为代理理论和五大人格模型，研究CEO人格如何影响其对分析师正面推荐的反应，进而调节分析师作为外部监督者降低代理成本的效力。
Abstract We integrate behavioral agency research and the five‐factor model of personality to re‐visit investment analysts' efficacy as a mechanism for reducing agency costs. We highlight the role of personality in shaping how CEOs respond to analyst recommendations, leading to boundary conditions for the efficacy of analysts as external monitors. We theorize that the extent to which a CEO perceives a threat from more positive analyst recommendations is contingent upon their personality, which shapes their subjective interpretation of the recommendation and their use of income‐increasing earnings management in response. Our findings suggest that personality is critical to understanding how CEOs respond to external monitors and the agency costs associated with the positive analyst recommendations.