Dynamic matching with transfers
研究了两边市场动态匹配中转移支付的影响，发现对于先入先出协议福利可能提高，对于后入先出协议在某些等待成本下福利反而降低，且转移支付无法实现社会最优。
I study a two-sided market of dynamic matching with sequential arrivals. Agents trade off waiting to match with a more desirable agent with immediately matching with a less desirable agent. I study the consequences of transfer availability for two protocols: first-in-first-out (FIFO) and last-in-first-out (LIFO). For FIFO, welfare is weakly greater with transfers than without. For LIFO, there is a range of waiting costs such that welfare is weakly lower with transfers than without. For sufficiently low waiting costs, the equilibrium welfare for FIFO with transfers remains strictly lower than socially optimal. Thus, unlike in a static matching setting, transfers in my dynamic matching setting do not generate utilitarian efficient outcomes.