CEO tenure and environmental fraud for listed family firms
研究2012-2019年中国上市家族企业CEO任期与环境欺诈的关系，发现任期越长越易违规，独立董事能抑制欺诈但提高发现率，家族CEO比非家族专业CEO更易违规。
Abstract This paper examines CEO tenure's impact on the environmental fraud committed by listed Chinese family firms from the year 2012 to 2019. Using a bivariate probit model, we provide robust evidence that CEO tenure is positively related to the environmental fraud commission, indicating that longer‐serving CEOs are more likely to violate environmental regulations and to commit fraud in the family firms. Besides, when there is a higher proportion of independent directors, CEO tenure is negatively related to the environmental fraud commission but positively related to fraud detection. Moreover, when there is a greater proportion of family members in senior positions, CEOs with longer tenure are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Our additional analysis finds that compared to non‐family professional CEOs, family CEOs are more likely to commit environmental fraud. Overall, our results call for the introduction of CEO tenure limits and the increased recruitment of independent directors in family firms.